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INCONSISTENT LEVELS OF GENERALITY IN THE
CHARACTERIZATION OF UNENUMERATED
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
John F. Basiak, Jr.*
"[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right."'
-

Justice Brandeis, April 11, 1932

2
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.",

-

Justice Scalia, June 26, 2003
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1. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992)).
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I. INTRODUCTION

Highly publicized cases such as Lawrence v. Texas3 and Williams v.
Attorney General of Alabama4 bring to light a continuing weakness in
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.' These cases illustrate that the U.S.
Supreme Court has failed to provide the guidance necessary to advance
coherent decisionmaking in the lower federal courts,6 promote the
perception that the federal judiciary is transcendent of politically divisive
issues,7 and develop methodologies capable of defining the role of the

3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
5. The Fourteenth Amendment states in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

6. See Denise E. Choquette, Note, Reno v. Flores and the Supreme Court 's Continuing
Trend Toward Narrowing Due Process Rights, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 115, 123 (1995)
(explaining how the current confusion in due process jurisprudence has reduced its doctrinal
integrity).
7. When courts inconsistently utilize methods for characterizing fundamental rights or
inadequately articulate their methodology, both court observers and the general public perceive
their reasoning as results-oriented jurisprudence. In the wake of Williams, one columnist offered
this criticism:
Between the cheap-shot framing, the too-easy slippery slope argument (citing the
inexorable path from sex toys to "adult incest, prostitution, obscenity, and the
like"), and the ever popular contention that judges must never second-guess
legislatures on anything, the majority opinion in Williams sounds virtually every
note in the increasingly ugly wars over the activist judges and invalid
constitutional interpretation. Buried amid the dismissive rhetoric, there is a
creditable discussion of the constitutional limits of Lawrence here. But as judges
are increasingly tempted to thrash out the culture wars in the pages of their
opinions, the label "activist judge" starts to fit either side rather well.
Dahlia Lithwick, A Sexual Bill ofRights, SLATE, Aug. 4,2004, availableat http://www.slate.com/
id/2104768 (last visited Feb. 15, 2005); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, AbstractionandAuthority,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 373 (1992) ("The rule of law attracts formidable support only so long as
people believe that there is a rule of law and not a rule byjudges."); Jeffrey Rosen, SexAppeal, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, July 30, 2003, availableat http://faculty.smu.edu/jkobylka/newsltems/Lawrence
%20TNR.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
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judiciary! Specifically, when asked to recognize a fundamental right under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,9 the U.S. Supreme
Court has failed to articulate a substantial justification for the level of
generality in characterizing the legal issue.'"
When a complaining party alleges that a state or federal statute violates
a fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, before it can
evaluate the merits of the claim, the court must first characterize the legal
issue. The manner in which the court characterizes the issue critically
defines the scope and boundaries of its reasoning and significantly impacts
its holding." If the court frames an asserted fundamental right with a
highly specific level of generality so that only a handful of historically
protected traditions are relevant, 2 there is only a small likelihood that it
8. By permitting manipulation ofthe level ofgenerality, judges improperly expand their role
in government, infringe upon the responsibilities of political actors and violate the principle of
separation of powers. "Instead of assuming power and then searching for a level of abstraction, the
court should search for that degree of generality capable ofjustifying ajudicial role." Easterbrook,
supra note 7, at 372.
9. The term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause has been interpreted to incorporate selected
enumerated rights found within the Bill of Rights, as well as selected unenumerated rights, which
are "chiefly determined based on the historical accident of which sorts of cases [the courts] elect
to hear." Lithwick, supra note 7. Since the repudiation of "the use of substantive due process as a
basis for protecting economic rights, the Supreme Court has struggled to find a firm foundation for
other rights not explicitly delineated in the constitutional text." Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C.
Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1059-60 (1990).
Inherently, given the "scarce and open-ended" nature of a case-by-case determination of "liberty,"
the danger exists that judges may ".. . read into the Constitution their own subjective sympathies
and social preferences." See ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 61 (1990) (citing
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). For example, although there is no mention of contraception
or family planning within the text of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
as fundamental the right of married persons to use birth control and the right of women to choose
to have an abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
10. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 358 (arguing that it is important to have a consistent theory
of choice because the level of generality can be used to justify any outcome).
11. The Origins and Scope of Roe v. Wade: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Apr. 22, 1996 (testimony
of Mark Tushnet, Professor, Georgetown University) ("Everything turns on how specifically or
abstractly we define the right claimed to be fundamental."); BORK, supranote 9, at 148 (stating that
the level of generality is of crucial importance).
12. In recent years, the debate over the level of generality has typically occurred within the
context of whether an asserted fundamental right has been traditionally and historically protected.
A court will characterize the issue by referencing history and tradition, and then will review history
to determine whether similar traditions have been protected. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293-94 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 122-24 (1989) (plurality); see also David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover
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will recognize a new right. 3 If the court frames an asserted fundamental
right more abstractly 4 so that any number of historically protected
traditions apply, its recognition of a new right is much more promising.
Certainly, fundamental rights have long been a focus of significant
scholarly and political debate. But this debate has paid little attention to
the particular methodology the court uses to characterize the issues. In
times like these, when cultural forces are waging a political battle over
contentious issues such as gay rights, courts must undertake a thoughtprovoking review of their characterization of asserted fundamental rights.
The absence of a thorough examination of generality only perpetuates the
cynical, but unfortunately accurate, perspective that courts too often
engage in results-oriented jurisprudence. 5 Furthermore, existing literature
and recent fundamental rights case law have created a constitutional
environment that begs further examination of the appropriate level of
generality.
Immediately following the decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,16
prominent scholars wrote on these difficulties. 7 Although there is no
UnenumeratedFundamentalRights? Cataloguingthe Methods ofJudicalAlchemy, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 795, 865 (1996). For example, if an asserted fundamental right receives a high level
of abstraction, such as "the right to be left alone," a court will examine statutes, common law and
precedent to determine whether there are other rights "to be left alone" that have been historically
protected. If a court concludes that other "rights to be left alone" have been established or protected
in the past (which, undoubtedly, it will), then the asserted fundamental right will be recognized.
Conversely, if the characterization of the asserted right is descriptive, such as "whether the right
to buy vibrators has been historically protected," only a few, if any, relevant traditions are likely
to exist. Therefore, the asserted right will probably not be recognized. Although generality, history,
and tradition have recently been more frequently linked, the two-tiered system favored by some
courts is not required. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (commenting that history
is usually the starting point of the inquiry, but it does not have to be the ending point).
13. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 352.
14. See id. at 353 (commenting on how words such as "general" and "abstract" are terms that
are general in nature, which can create confusion and misunderstanding).
15. See David B. Anders, Note, JusticesHarlanandBlack Revisited: The EmergingDispute
Between Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia Over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 895,909 (1993) (arguing that by narrowly defining the right at issue, judges can
reject the right for lack of specific constitutional support, without dealing with broader, more
difficult issues); see also Gina D. Patterson, The Supreme Court Passes the Torch on Physician
AssistedSuicide:Washington v. GlucksbergandVacco v. Quill, 35 Hous. L. REV. 851,871 (1998).
But see Crump, supra note 12, at 869 (arg-ding that a specific definition of the tradition does not
inevitably lead to a choice against that right).
16. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110.
17. See Tribe & Dorf, supranote 9; Bruce Ackerman, LiberatingAbstraction, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317 (1992); Easterbrook, supranote 7. Tribe is the Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at
Harvard Law School; Ackerman is the Sterling Professor of Law & Political Science at Yale
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doubt that these publications played a valuable role in advancing the
Fourteenth Amendment dialogue, there are two reasons why further
discussion is needed. First, recent decisions such as Lawrence and
Williams have renewed the debate on generality by demonstrating that the
U.S. Supreme Court still fails to provide jurisprudence that is consistent
enough to guide lower federal courts. Second, there exists a need to
independently evaluate the problem of generality in unenumerated rights.
Previous discussions have focused largely on the generality problem in
broad perspective, but this Article focuses specifically on unenumerated
fundamental rights. There is no doubt that the generality problem exists in
almost all areas of the law, whether constitutional 8 or otherwise, 9 but the
difficulties associated with unenumerated rights are wholly distinct and
require an innovative, novel examination.

University; Judge Easterbrook sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and is a
senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School.
18. Generality is problematic in enumerated fundamental rights, separation of powers, the
Commerce Clause, and the Takings Clause. See Ackerman, supra note 17, at 318-19, 46-48.
19. The difficulties in determining the level of generality are not unique to an analysis of
fundamental rights. The same problem occurs in intellectual property cases in determining the
scope of copyright protection. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. Judge Learned Hand was
asked to compare two plays featuring feuding Irish Catholic and Jewish families to determine
whether one play infringed on the copyright of the other. Nicholas v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). The plaintiff's play, Abie's Irish Rose, presented a Jewish family living
in prosperous circumstances in New York. The father, a widower, had only one son. Id. at 120. The
boy fell in love with a young woman, who to his father's great disgust was Irish Catholic. Id. The
defendant's play, The Cohens and the Kellys, presented two families living side by side in the
poorer quarters of New York. Id. The wives in both families were still living and the families
shared a mutual animosity that existed before any relationship between the children developed. Id.
The issue in the case was whether the defendant's play was "substantially similar" to the plaintiff's.
Nicholas, 45 F.2d at 121. The circuit court had no doubt that the two plays factually corresponded,
but it refused to hold that the defendant had infringed on the plaintiffs copyright. Id. Copyrights
protect expression, not ideas, and the circuit court reasoned that the characterization of the
plaintiffs expression could not extend to all plays involving feuding Jewish and Irish Catholic
families. Id. at 122. Limiting the generality of the expression to the detail of the actors, rather than
feuding Jewish and Irish Catholic families, meant that the scope of the plaintiff's copyright could
not extend to include the defendant's play. Id. Similar to an analysis of fundamental rights, the
circuit court selected a level of generality based entirely on what it deemed appropriate for the
individual case and not by reference to a formalistic system. This method of reasoning leaves a
court with unfettered discretion and creates inconsistency and uncertainty in copyright
jurisprudence. See generally John W.L. Ogilvie, Defining ComputerProgramPartsUnderLearned
Hand'sAbstractions Test in Software CopyrightInfringement Cases, 91 MICH. L. REv. 526 (1992)
(implicating the generality problem in intellectual property); Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the
Law of Software Copyright?, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1995); Richard Armstrong Beutel, Software
EngineeringPracticesand the Idea/ExpressionDichotomy: StructuredDesign in Methodologies
Define the Scope of Software Copyright?, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1991).
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The major challenge in evaluating unenumerated rights is that, because
they have no basis in the text of the U.S. Constitution, they cannot provide
their own formula for a level of generality.20 In comparison, consider two
enumerated rights that do provide their own formula: the Third
Amendment's defense against quartering soldiers and the Eighth
Amendment's safeguard against cruel and unusual punishment. The Third
Amendment states: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law."'" The Eighth Amendment states:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."2 The two texts thus stipulate two
different levels of generality. The Third Amendment is very fact-specific
and therefore demands a high (or narrow) level of generality, while the
Eighth Amendment speaks in more abstract terms and therefore requires
a low (or broad) level of generality.23
Contrary to enumerated rights, unenumerated rights provide no
inherent mechanism of interpretation. Absent guidance from the U.S.
Supreme Court, lower federal courts have been left to characterize these
rights in whatever manner they see fit. Admittedly, their lack of textual
support leaves unenumerated rights inherently susceptible to manipulation
by both conservative and liberal judges2 4 and tempts constitutional
scholars to reinterpret their meaning in a manner that is consistent with
their own jurisprudential outlook. 25 However, the "discovery" 26 of

20. BoRK, supra note 9, at 149; see also Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 365 (pointing out how
different constitutional amendments operate on dramatically different planes of generality).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23. Quite clearly, "narrow level of generality" and "broad level of generality" are not precise
terms, but they are good indicators as to how a court should characterize an issue involving those
rights.
24. For a number of reasons, this author has reservations about labeling judges as "liberal"
or "conservative." Too often these terms are used improperly or deceptively to describe political
liberalism or conservativism when in fact they address specific judicial philosophies relating to the
nature and responsibilities of the judiciary. In short, judicial liberalism is sometimes described as
taking an active role in policy determinations in cases that could alternatively be deferred to the
wisdom of the legislature. It is also defined as "[a]n interpretation that applies a writing in light of
the situation presented and that tends to effectuate the spirit and purpose of the writing." BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY 135 (2d pocket ed. 2001). The tension that exists between these philosophies can
be seen in the most famous footnote in U.S. Supreme Court history. See United States v. Carolene
Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Without expressingjudgment as to the unanswerable question
of which method is superior, this Article addresses the weaknesses in both liberal and conservative
methods for determining the appropriate level of generality for unenumerated fundamental rights.
25. Liberal scholars such as Tribe incorrectly attempt to present enumerated and
unenumerated rights in the Bill of Rights as a "coherent whole." See Easterbrook, supranote 7, at
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unenumerated rights should not be a tool for results-oriented members of
the legal community. In fact, requiring courts to use a moderate level of
generality, and to apply it rigorously and consistently to the
characterization of potential unenumerated fundamental rights, may help
to solve many of the difficulties explained herein.
By analogizing legal writing techniques, this Article examines the
magnitude and consequences of how courts characterize potential
fundamental rights. Then, by providing a limited case survey, it charts
current judicial approaches to determine whether they are effective and
consistent. Finally, it argues that the manner in which courts characterize
unenumerated fundamental rights must be reevaluated in favor of a
genuine, consistent and pragmatic approach.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE "QUESTION PRESENTED"
Presenting an issue in favorable terms and effectively defining the
boundaries of analysis induces a reader to evaluate the issues of law and
fact as guided by the lens of the writer's camera.27 In legal writing, "the
lens of the camera" is commonly referred to as the Question Presented and
serves two important functions.28 It defines the decision that the reader is
asked to make, and also can be used as a tool of persuasion.29
To construct a persuasive Question Presented, legal writers generally
consider several guidelines: the issue should (1) be stated in terms of the
364. These scholars also question why conservative scholars do not uniformly apply their narrow
level of generality to other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. See Ackerman, supra note 17, at
318-19 (criticizing Justice Scalia for inconsistently applying broad generality to separation of
powers and narrow generality to fundamental rights); see also id. at 321 (calling Easterbrook a
"selective abstractionist"). But the search for consistency in generality should focus on asserted
rights that provide no textual indication ofhow they should be characterized. Offering an approach
that provides a consistent level of generality for both enumerated and unenumerated rights only
invites further difficulties and compromises coherence. Furthermore, Tribe's criticisms fail to
recognize the uniquely problematic pitfalls of unenumerated rights.
26. This Article makes no attempt to rectify the questionable legitimacy of unenumerated
fundamental rights.
27. See MARY BERNARD RAY& JILLJ. RAMSFIELD, LEGAL WRITING: GETTING IT RIGHT AND
GETTING IT WRITTEN 289 (3d ed. 2000); Patricia M. Wald, 19 Tips from 19 Years on the Appellate
Bench, 1 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 7, 12 (1999); see also Tracy Bach, Teachingthe Poetryof the
QuestionPresented,9 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 142 (2001); Patterson, supranote

15, at 871 (arguing that the key to winning the debate lies in framing the inquiry).
28. See Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a) (requiring that a petition for awrit of certiorari include questions
presented). Additionally, interoffice legal memoranda and judicial opinions utilize a formal
"Question Presented" section.
29. RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 355 (4th ed. 2001).
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facts of the case; (2) eliminate all unnecessary detail; (3) be readily
comprehensible on first reading; (4) avoid self-evident conclusions; (5)
leave the reader no choice but to accept it as an accurate statement of the
question; (6) be subtly persuasive; and (7) clearly define the decision the
court is being asked to make.3" One may not need to individually address
each of these factors, but should keep in mind a few overarching themes.
The Question Presented sets forth the theory of the case and offers the
opportunity to provide a prediction of what will subsequently be argued.
As famed scholar Karl N. Llwellyn stated:
Of course, the first thing that comes up is the issue and the first art
is the framing of the issue so that if your framing is accepted the
case comes out your way. Got that? Second, you have to capture the
issue, because your opponent will be framing an issue very
differently... And third, you have to build a technique of phrasing
your issue which will not only capture the Court but which will
stick your capture into the Court's head so that it can't forget it.3
Since the Question Presented serves as an early roadmap, it is important
to remain credible. A legal writer should always avoid factual inferences
and conclusions of law because "[j]udges ignore [q]uestions that go
beyond the solid facts."32
By way of example, the following is a formula for a typical Question
Presented: "Whether a certain legal status exists when relevant law
governs the situation and these legally significant facts exist."33 Applying
this formula to the facts and law of Lawrence could yield any of the
following choices: 34(1) whether there exists a fundamental right to be left
alone; (2) whether there exists a fundamental right to engage in sexual acts
in the privacy of your own home; or (3) whether there exists a fundamental
right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidate the laws
of many states, which make such conduct illegal and have done so for a

30. Id. at 358; see also

MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE

ADVOCACY 111 (2002); ROBIN S. WELLFORD, LEGAL REASONING, WRITING, AND PERSUASIVE

(2002).
31. Bryan A. Garner, The Deep Issue: A New Approach to FramingLegal Questions, 5
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1, 11 (1994-1995) (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate
Advocacy, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 627, 630 (1962)).
32. NEUMANN, supra note 29, at 358.
33. BEAZLEY, supra note 30, at 111.
34. In Lawrence, the petitioner sought to invalidate a Texas statute that banned intimate
sexual conduct between two members of the same sex. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564
(2003).
ARGUMENT
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very long time. Strikingly, although each of the three examples is based on
an identical set of facts, formulation one is overtly favorable to a party
seeking recognition of a fundamental right, while formulation three is
explicitly unfavorable. By manipulating the level of generality, the legal
writer powerfully frames and loads the issue presented in a manner that,
if adopted by the court, provides a predictable result.
There is no doubt that a legal writer should formulate the Question
Presented favorably to the party he or she represents. However, even
though a grossly manipulated level of generality may appear convincing,
a legal writer must also be mindful that the ultimate goal of advocacy is
that a court will adopt the reasoning of the brief. Thus, while an advocate
in favor of recognition of a right may be tempted to frame the issue very
broadly, a court may not sympathize with such an approach.
The American court system depends upon attorneys acting in an aptly
zealous manner on behalf of their clients. There is nothing wrong with a
legal writer attempting to frame the Question Presented as reasonably or
absurdly as he or she wishes. But there is a problem when the judiciary
takes such action. When a court adopts overly zealous language or
undertakes its own inappropriate formulation of the Question Presented,
it distorts its role as an objective truth-seeker while cloaking itself in the
appearance of restraint. Unlike legal writers, judges must frame issues in
a way that dictates a genuine analysis of the law and facts, free from
preconceived notions. When judges take it upon themselves to manipulate
the issue, they provide a shrewd opportunity for results-oriented
jurisprudence. Rather than appearing biased by improperly applying the
law or mischaracterizing the facts, a results-oriented judge can frame the
issue with a level of generality that commands the desired effect, while
preserving the ability to properly apply the law and facts in a structure that
manufactures a predictable result.
Absent any affirmative methodology to provide a consistent and
reasonable level of generality, which would limit judicial abuse of the
Question Presented, Supreme Court jurisprudence is greatly influenced by
whichever Justice has the opportunity to frame the Question Presented.
The following survey of fundamental rights cases35 illustrates that this
approach, or lack thereof, is in need of reexamination.

35. The survey of cases presented in this Article is by no means a comprehensive list of
fundamental rights cases featuring the generality problem. These cases do however provide enough
information to illustrate the inconsistency of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.
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RIGHTS CASES

The appropriate starting point to a discussion on the level of generality
in

unenumerated

fundamental

rights36

begins

with

Griswold v.

Connecticut,37

in which the court characterized the issue at hand in
infamously broad terms and demonstrated the dangers of unfettered
judicial discretion.3 8 In Griswold,the U.S. Supreme Court39 invalidated a
Connecticut statute that made it illegal to provide "information,
instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of
preventing conception." 4 With little legal reasoning, a majority of the
Court, through Justice Douglas, asked whether the penumbral rights of the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments of the Bill of Rights41
created a "zone of privacy" which prevented the government from
infringing upon the petitioner's rights to counsel his patients.42 The socalled "penumbra of rights analysis," previously unknown in U.S.

36. Justice Douglas's analysis did not specifically address the Fourteenth Amendment's right
to "liberty," but nevertheless, today Griswoldis recognized within a fundamental rights context.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (stating that the most pertinent beginning point to analyzing
"liberty" under the Due Process Clause is the decision in Griswold);see also Gregory C. Cook,
Note, Footnote 6: JusticeScalia 's Attempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process,
14 HARv. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 853, 879 (1991). But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594-95 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Griswoldexpressly disclaimed any reliance on substantive due process).
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. Although the Court proclaims that it will not "sit as a super-legislature to determine the
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions," it is clear that many conservative jurists such as Justices Black, Stone, Scalia, or Judge
Bork would argue that the Court in Griswolddid just that. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. In his
thoughtful dissent, Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, expressed concern for the majority's
characterization of the issue, which created a right to "privacy." Id.at 508 (Black, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Black is sympathetic to the petitioner's situation, he does not believe that the
constitutional guarantees that the majority discusses are supported by any specific constitutional
provision. Id.at 510.
39. The group ofjustices who sat during the 1967-1968 term have been described as "the
most 'liberal' in the entire history of the high tribunal. [The Court] was dominated by five liberal
activists: Chief Justice Warren and Associate Justices William 0. Douglas, William Brennan, Abe
Fortas, and Thurgood Marshall." Michael R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War:
The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REv. 65, 68 (1998).
40. Griswold,381 U.S. at 480 (citing C.G.S.A. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958 rev.)).
41. Justice Douglas cited to the right of association contained within the penumbra of the
First Amendment; the Third Amendment's guarantee of privacy against quartering soldiers; the
Fourth Amendment's explicit guarantee to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects;"
and the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination as "enable[ing] [a] citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment." Id.
at 484. Justice Douglas also cited to the "retained rights" of the Ninth Amendment. Id.
42. Id.at 484-85.
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Supreme Court jurisprudence, provided an opportunity for the Court to
evaluate whether general notions of "privacy" found in the U.S.
Constitution protected the conduct at issue. Given this expansive mandate
accompanied by such a broad generality,43 the Court concluded that the
state's governance of such intimate conduct between married persons was
"repulsive" to the U.S. Constitution. 44
Following Griswold, another early fundamental rights case
demonstrating the implications of a broad level of generality was Loving
v. Virginia.45 In Loving, the defendants were a married couple prosecuted
under Virginia criminal law for violating a statute that banned interracial
marriage.46 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren stated that the
question presented was whether the choice to marry could be restricted by
invidious racial discrimination.47 Concluding that "marriage is one of the
'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and
' the Court answered its own question with a resounding "no."
survival,"48
As evidenced from the description of both Griswold and Loving, the
Court offered little reasoning for their broad level of generality in early
fundamental rights cases. The reason for the Court's generality is
threefold. First, the Court's primary concern was to invalidate laws that
clashed starkly with American values, which had been dramatically
defined by the civil rights and women's liberation movements. Second, the
Court had not yet found a "firm foundation"4' 9 for its substantive due
process analysis. Third, during that time, scholars were not concerned with
judicial activism and the dangers of judge-made policy decisions. Few

43. Although Justice Douglas cited cases suggesting certain amendments have "penumbras,"
he cited no precedent for his notion of a "penumbra of rights" or "zone of privacy." See id. at 48485.
44. Id. at 485-86.
45. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
46. Id. at 2-3. Although the defendants were sentenced to a year in jail, their sentence was
commuted in exchange for their promise not to return to the state of Virginia for at least twenty-five
years. Id. at 3. In commuting their sentence, the Judge made the following statement:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.
Id.
47. See id. at 12.
48. Id.
49. Tribe & Doff, supra note 9, at 1059-60.
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people would have considered the Court's characterization of an issue to
be a tool for usurping the will of the people."0
Despite what some would see as progress in the jurisprudence of the
U.S. Supreme Court, the broadly worded approach of Griswoldand Loving
has not always commanded a majority." Subsequent to the leadership of
Chief Justice Warren, the makeup of the Court shifted, and by the time of
Bowers v. Hardwick,52 there was no longer a liberal majority. In Bowers,
a practicing homosexual brought an action challenging a Georgia statute
that criminalized the practice of sodomy.53 Justice White, presented the
issue in exceedingly narrow terms: "The issue presented is whether the
Federal Constitution confers afundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that
still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time. "

Justice White's characterization of the issue in Bowers is very striking.
Like any persuasive Question Presented, it directs the reader down an
inevitable path and makes immediately apparent that there is only one
answer to the Court's hypothetical question.55 No reasonable person would
ever consider the notion that the U.S. Constitution confers a fundamental
right to explicitly engage in sodomy. 56 The Court found that since the text
of the U.S. Constitution does not mention homosexuals or sodomy and

50. Critics of substantive due process suggest that judges should not find or declare
fundamental rights because it is a job more legitimately suited for the citizens of a democracy who
can vote to determine what protections should be included within the text of the U.S. Constitution.
See James W. Hillard, To Accomplish Fairness and Justice: Substantive Due Process, 30 J.
MARsHALL L. REV. 95, 111 (1996); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
(echoing caution in expanding the doctrine of due process at the expense of democratic ideals such
as public debate and legislative action). But see Brian C. Goebel, Note, Who Decides If There Is
"Triumph in the Ultimate Agony?" ConstitutionalTheory and the EmergingRight To Die With
Dignity, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 850 (1996) (arguing that the doctrine of substantive due
process is a necessary check on legislative and executive power).
51. Justice Brennan famously quipped, "[f]ive votes can do anything around here." Richard
Lacago, The Soul of a New Majority, TIME, July 10, 1995, at 48.
52. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
53. Id. at 188.
54. Id. at 190 (emphasis added). By comparing this language to the language issue in Loving
or in Griswold, it is easy to see the effects of the characterization of the issue. See supra text
accompanying notes 41-42, 48. Narrowly describing the circumstances in which a right can be
found makes the chances of the petitioner's success very unlikely.
55. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 9, at 1067 (commenting on how both the Bowers majority
and dissent began with question-begging formulations).
56. When a question posed by the Court is "gorgeously loaded language ... [it is n]ot
surprising that the answer to that question was, 'Um. No."' Lithwick, supra note 7.
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sodomy is not a right that has been traditionally or historically protected
by society, the statute was constitutional. 7
In dissent, Justice Blackmun articulated an alternate level of
generality:58 "[a] fair reading of the statute and of the complaint clearly
reveal[ed] that the majority had distorted the question [the] case
present[ed]."59 The case was "no more about a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy.., than Stanley v. Georgia60 ... was about
61
a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States
... was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone
booth. '62 Rather, the case should more rightly be characterized as "the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,
namely, the right to be let alone."63 The Court's "almost obsessive focus
on homosexual activity"' prevented it from evaluating the genuine issue
in the case. The Court avoided deciding the constitutionality of
by
government intrusion into the private affairs of consenting adults
65
framing the issue in a way which provided a preordained result.
Although Bowers may have been the first unenumerated fundamental
rights case to present the question in narrow terms, it is not the most

57. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-94; supra text accompanying note 12-13 (discussing the
U.S. Supreme Court's use of history and tradition in its fundamental rights analysis).
58. Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Interestingly,
Justice Powell, upon retiring from the bench, later commented to one of his law clerks that he
regretted his decision to side with the majority. Tony Mauro, Gay Rights a PersonalIssuefor High
Court Advocate (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1048518202633 (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). Justice Powell also believed, that at the time, he had
never actually met a homosexual. Id.
59. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun
demonstrated that the Question Presented by Justice White contained a more specific level of
generality than the statute.
60. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In Stanley, the defendant was convicted of a Georgia statute that
made it a crime to possess obscene materials. Id. at 558-59. The defendant appealed, and the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, on the grounds that a ban on mere possession of obscene materials in
one's own home was a violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 568.
61. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the defendant was convicted of bookkeeping crimes. Id.
at 348. Law enforcement officers had used an electronic device to listen and record the defendant's
conversations absent a search warrant. Id. at 356-57. The U.S. Supreme Court held that utilizing
electronic devices, without a search warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 359.
62. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (internal quotations omitted).
63. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)) (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 200.
65. See Choquette, supra note 6, at 129.
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famous case to do so. 66 In MichaelH. v. GeraldD.67 Justice Scalia, for the
first time, explained his methodology and distinguished it from the broadly
worded methodology of the Court's more liberal members.68 In footnotes
that riddle the opinion, Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia reproach one
another on their respective methods of determining the correct level of
generality.69 Justice Brennan merely contended that broader approaches
should not be foreclosed,7" whereas Justice Scalia fully articulated his
narrow approach and argued that it should be applied to every fundamental
rights case.
In MichaelH.,71 a man whose blood tests indicated there was a 98.07%
probability of paternity and who had established a parental relationship
with his daughter, Victoria D., filed an action to establish paternity and
visitation rights.72 Carole D., the mother of Victoria, had an affair with the
plaintiff while married to another man, Gerald D. 73 Three years after
Victoria was born, Carole informed Michael that he may be the child's
father. 74 After a blood test indicated a high probability that Michael was
Victoria's father, Michael began a relationship with Victoria.75 However,
shortly thereafter, Carole began living with another man, and rebuffed
Michael's attempts to visit Victoria.7 6 Michael then challenged a California
statute,77 which presumed that a child born to a married woman living with
her husband is a child of the marriage, on the theory that it infringed upon
his fundamental right to maintain a relationship with his daughter.

66. See Adam B. Wolf, Note, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights,
57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 101, 112 (2002) (mentioning how Michael H. brought fundamental rights
jurisprudence to the forefront).
67. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
68. See Crump, supra note 12, at 866-68. The problems associated with choosing the
appropriate level of generality had not been addressed in cases such as Bowers. Id. at 866 n.318.
69. "[O]n the surface [Justice Scalia] merely takes a potshot at Justice Brennan [in footnote
4]." Tribe & Doff,supra note 9,at 1096; see also id.(citing Justice Brennan's criticism that
footnote 6 is "arrogance cloaked as humility").
70. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6; see also Cook, supra note 36, at 866 n.74.
71. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113.
72. Id.at 114.
73. Id.at 113.
74. Id.at 114.
75. See id.
76. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
77. CAL.EviD.CODE § 621(a) (West 1989).
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Writing for a plurality of the Court,78 Justice Scalia narrowly defined
the issue in the case as "whether the relationshipbetween persons in the
situation of Michael and Victoria has been treatedas a protectedfamily
unit under the historicpracticesof our society, or whether on any other
basis it has been accordedspecialprotection."79 Given Scalia's narrow
interpretation of the issue at hand, the plurality found that Michael and
Victoria's relationship was not one which deserved special protection.8"
In footnote 6 of the opinion, Justice Scalia defended his narrow
characterization of the issue in the case:
Though the dissent has no basis for the level of generality it would
select, we do: We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can
be identified. If, for example, there were no societal tradition, either
way, regarding the rights of the natural father of a child
adulterously conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible)
reason from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in general. But
there is such a more specific tradition, and it unqualifiedly denies
protection to such a parent.81
As Justice Scalia viewed it, his decision to refer to the most specific level
of generality possible avoided "arbitrary decisionmaking."82 The Court
was bound to an identifiable tradition which prevented judicial activism
and eliminated the temptation to infuse political and social preferences.83
Notably, footnote 6 isjoined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist.84 Justice
O'Connor (joined by Justice Kennedy) wrote separately to express
disagreement with Justice Scalia's methodology: "I concur in all but
78. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113. Five Justices held that the statute did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment; four Justices joined the plurality opinion (except for footnote 6, in which
only Chief Justice Rehnquistjoined). Id. The statute states, "Except as provided in subdivision (b),
the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively
presumed to be a child of the marriage." Id. Justice Stevens concurred separately and Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White dissented. Id. at 112. Although Justice White wrote the
majority opinion in Bowers, he curiously filed a dissent in Michael H., in which Justice Brennan
joined which focuses its criticism on a narrow level of generality. Id.
79. Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
80. "[Justice] Scalia narrowly defined the right at issue so as to assure that the conclusion that
he was looking for would naturally follow." Choquette, supra note 6, at 130.
81. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
82. Id.
83. Justice Scalia "is primarily concerned with 'judicial activism' undermining the legitimacy
of the Court." Choquette, supranote 6, at 129.
84. Michael H.,491 U.S. at 113.
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footnote 6 of Justice Scalia's opinion. This footnote sketches a mode of
historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be
somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this area."85 In her view,
applying the most specific level of generality, without deliberation,
contradicts the reasoning of previous fundamental rights cases.86
Similar to Bowers, 7 the dissent in Michael H.provides an illustrative
comparison of generality.88 Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Brennan
characterized the issue in the case as "whetherparenthoodis an interest
that historically has received our attention and protection."89 Justice
Scalia responded:
Because such general traditions provide such imprecise guidance,
they permitjudges to dictate rather than discern the society's views.
The need, if arbitrary decisionmaking is to be avoided, to adopt the
most specific tradition as the point of reference - or at least to
announce, as Justice [Brennan] declines to do, some other criterion
for selecting among the innumerable relevant traditions that could
be consulted.... Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that)
of leaving judges free to decide as they think best when the
unanticipated occurs, a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by
any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.9°
Undoubtedly, the point of Justice Scalia's specific generality methodology
is to prevent legislative-like policy decisions that activist judges are able
to make because of the open-ended nature of the Due Process Clause's
right to "liberty."91 Conversely, Justice Brennan, like Justice Blackmun in

85. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
86. "On occasion this Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights
at levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific level' available." Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94
(1987); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709 (1987)).
87. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
88. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. See Michael
H., 491 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 127 n.6.
91. Crump, supra note 12, at 868 (arguing that Justice Scalia's approach protects legislative
power and Justice Brennan's approach empowers the "judicial legislator").
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Bowers, is less concerned with activism and more interested in the
expansion and protection of individual rights.92
[T]he plurality acts as if the only purpose of the Due Process Clause
is to confirm the importance of interests already protected by a
majority of the States. Transforming the protection afforded by the
Due Process Clause into a redundancy mocks those who, with care
and purpose, wrote the Fourteenth Amendment.93
The evaluation of isolated examples of liberty issues, instead of the general
liberty issues, would only serve to reinforce already protected rights and
strengthen prejudices.94
Perhaps conceding the defeat of his footnote 6 methodology, in Reno
v. Flores9 5 Justice Scalia did not apply his "most specific level" of
generality requirement; instead, Scalia settled for a "moderately-narrow"
level of generality. In Flores, a class of juvenile aliens who had been
detained because of deportability suspicions, brought suit challenging the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's regulations governing the
release of detained juvenile aliens into the custody of "responsible
adults."9 6 Without reference to MichaelH., Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, stated that a "[s]ubstantive due process analysis must begin with a
careful description of the asserted right, for '[t]he doctrine ofjudicial selfrestraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to
break new ground in this field."' 98 Sounding the same activism alarm bells
in Michael H,99 Justice Scalia stated the issue at hand had nothing to do
with "freedom from physical restraint,"1 ° freedom to come and go at
will,'0 ' or the rights of parents to have their children released into their
custody.0 2 Instead, the issue is more properly characterized as whether "a
child who has no availableparent,close relative, or legal guardian,and
for whom the government is responsible,[has a fundamental right] to be

92. See MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. See generally id. at 136-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
96. Id. at 294, 296.
97. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110.
98. Flores, 507 U.S. at 302 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)
(citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986))).
99. See MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 110.
100. Flores, 507 U.S. at 302.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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placed in the custody of a willing-and-ableprivate custodian ratherthan
of a government-operated or government-selected child-care
institution."'0' 3 The exact implications of Scalia's "careful description"'"
requirement are unclear, and the requirement does not appear to differ in
any practical sense from footnote 6.105 Both formulations are at the narrow
end of the spectrum of generality, and in the vast majority of cases, a
court's decision to use either formulation will not impact its holding.
The cryptic nature of the careful description requirement,
unaccompanied by any citation, is more likely a strategic ploy rather than
a concession. At least in Flores, Justice Scalia gained the support of
Justice Kennedy, lO6 who, along with Justice O'Connor, concurred in all but
footnote 6 of Michael H. °7 Furthermore, following Flores,"°8 courts
adopted the "careful description" requirement in other groundbreaking
fundamental rights cases. 109
The confusion built into this point is exemplified in the recent case of
Lawrence v. Texas,"' a fitting example of the consequences of incoherent

103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
106. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 293.
107. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132.
108. Flores, 507 U.S. at 292.
109. In Washington v. Glucksberg,terminally ill patients, doctors, and a nonprofit organization
brought action against the State of Washington seeking declaratory judgment that a statute banning
assisted suicide violated substantive due process. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,707-08
(1997). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, cited Flores's "careful description"
requirement and determined that the issue was properly characterized as "whether the 'liberty'
specially protected by the Due Process Clause include[d] a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistancein doingso." Id. at 721,723 (emphasis added). Curiously and without
explanation, Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that neither the Ninth Circuit's characterization of
the issue, "whether there is a liberty interest in determiningthe time and mannerof one's death,"
or the respondent's, whether there is "'liberty to choose how to die 'and a rightto 'controlofone's
final days,"' were "carefully formulated." Id. at 722 (emphasis added). Concurring, Justice Souter
refused to reduce due process jurisprudence to any formula. In place of the two-tiered framework
and that included the "careful formulation" requirement, Justice Souter adopted the rational
continuum approach of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe. See id at 765-66 (Souter, J., concurring)
(citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Souter's method
results in a characterization of the issue as "whether the statute sets up one of those 'arbitrary
impositions' or 'purposeless restraints' at odds with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
110. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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fundamental rights jurisprudence. Its "intensely divisive" politics. 1'
demonstrate the continuing crisis of consistency and the inherent dangers
of judicial discretion in selecting the permissible level of generality.
Similar to Bowers,12 the petitioner in Lawrence was convicted of "deviate
sexual intercourse" in violation of a Texas statute that forbade two persons
of the same sex from engaging in intimate sexual conduct." 3 The delicate
politics of the case and the current makeup of the U.S. Supreme Court
which continues to evidence deep political and philosophical divisions," 4
made a consistent and principled approach to characterizing the issue as
an unrealistic goal.
The Court's opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, was a consequence
ofjudicial and political compromise that further fractured and complicated
fundamental rights jurisprudence." 5 Although the Court purported to
overrule Bowers," 6 in which the Court refused to find that there was a
fundamental right to engage in sodomy," 7 the Court in Lawrence did not
declare that there is a fundamental right to engage in sodomy and did not
use a strict scrutiny analysis."' Instead, by invoking "emerging"
traditions19 it conducted the same selective history lesson that Justice

111. Id. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting on how the issue in Lawrence may be as
divisive as the abortion issue in Roe).
112. 478 U.S. 1866 (1986).
113. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
114. See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DWIDED 9-12 (2005); see also Anders, supra
note 15, at 916 (describing a "rift" between even those justices who were at one point both
considered "conservative").
115. Justice Scalia explained that:
Today's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession
culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which
I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating
the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled." Id. at 578.
117. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 1866.
118. "Not once does [the Court] describe homosexual sodomy as a 'fundamental right' or a
'fundamental liberty interest,' nor does it subject the Texas statute to strict scrutiny." Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. Justice Kennedy concluded that "emerging" traditions were more relevant to the analysis:
[T]he past half century show[s] an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private

420
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Scalia is often criticized for, 12 and abandoned the 12long standing
application of the rational basis test for moral legislation.'
Despite Justice Kennedy's agreement with the careful formulation of
Flores,122 his refusal to join footnote 6 of Michael H. 23 served as a
precursor to the Court's decision in Lawrence.124 In refusing to join
footnote 6, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor emphasized that the Court has,
at times, used various levels of generality. 125 Justice Kennedy argued in
Lawrence that the Bowers Court's characterization of the issue failed "to
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake"' 26 and he implied that the
Court should revert back to the broader generality of Griswold. 27 Kennedy
stated, "To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just
as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual intercourse.' ' 28 Therefore, the Court should
have characterized the issue as "whether the majority may use the power
of the State to enforce.., views [basedon moralprinciples not before the
129
Court] on the whole society through operation of the criminal law.'
Justice Kennedy, like Justices Blackmun and Brennan before him,
attempted to demonstrate that by focusing on a specific factual example,
the Court fails to appreciate the larger liberty issue in the case.'
Neither the Lawrence opinion nor the Bowers' dissent describe any
procedural mechanisms or methodology used to determine level of
generality applied in those two cases.' Justice Kennedy states that the
narrow generality of Bowers demeans the petitioner's claim, but13he
2 does
not explain how he forms his more moderate level of generality.

lives in matters pertaining to sex. "[History and tradition are the starting point but
not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry."
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)).
120. See Wolf, supra note 66, at 103.
121. See generally id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. 507 U.S. 292, 293-94 (1994).
123. 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
124. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
125. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
127. The Court began its analysis with an evaluation of Griswold.Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
128. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
129. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
130. See generally id. at 558.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 567.
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The difficulties of Lawrence, and the problem of courts arbitrarily
selecting narrow, moderate or broad levels of generality, are further
illuminated at the circuit level in the recent case Williams v. Attorney
General.133 In Williams, the American Civil Liberties Union challenged an
Alabama statute that prohibited the commercial distribution of "any device
designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human
genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value.' 34 Utilizing the analytical
framework of Glucksberg13 5 and Flores,'36 a sharply divided court held that
37
the statute did not violate the petitioner's fundamental rights. 1
The circuit court characterized the issue in the case as whether the right
to "usesexual devices when engagingin lawful,privatesexual activity [is]
'objectively,
'..
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and
'implicit... in the concept of orderedliberty, such that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if[it] were sacrificed.'138 The circuit court's
0
characterization is similar to characterizations in Bowers, 139 Michael H,14
or Flores.14 1 However, unlike those cases, Williams arrives at the level of
generality by utilizing a "statutory scope method.' ' 142 Instead of calculating
the level of generality using the footnote 6 method or the "careful
description" method, the Court determined that "the scope of the liberty
interest at stake here must be defined in reference to the scope of the
Alabama statute.' 43 Since the statute in question banned the commercial
distribution of sexual devices and placed a burden on an individual's

133. 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
134. Id.at 1233 (11 th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted) (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-12200.2 (2003)).
135. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
136. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
137. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1233.
138. Id. at 1239 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The circuit court in Williams II also
stated that the district court properly characterized the issue as when it focused narrowly on the
right to use sexual devices. Id.(internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added) (citing Williams v.
Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2001)). The circuit court concluded that the district court
incorrectly framed the issue as a "generalized 'right to sexual privacy."' Id. (emphasis added)
(citing Williams II1, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 2002)). The dissent insisted that
Lawrence recognized that a liberty interest could not be defined by the scope of the conduct
prohibited. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1257 n.16 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Therefore, the issue,
according to Judge Barkett, should more properly be characterized as "whether consenting adults
have a right to sexualprivacy. ..."Id.at 1257 (emphasis added).
139. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
140. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
141. Flores,507 U.S. at 292.
142. See generally Williams, 378 F.3d at 1232.
143. Id. at 1241.
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in
ability to use such devices, the issue in the case should be characterized
44
devices.'
such
use
and
sell
buy,
to
right
a
describes
it
a way that
Despite the Williams Court's intent on maintaining the same level of
judicial restraint demonstrated by Justice Scalia, one could imagine a
scenario where the statutory scope method results in a holding contrary to
the footnote 6 method. If a criminal statute is general in nature, but not
unconstitutionally vague, such as a ban on lewd behavior, the level of
generality under the statutory scope method would be somewhat abstract.
The Court would be forced to characterize the issue as whether there was
a right to engage in lewd behavior, or some variation thereof. Contrarily,
under the footnote 6 method, the asserted right might be characterized
narrowly enough to actually describe the specific conduct. 145 Under
footnote 6 analysis, the issue would be characterized as whether there
exists a right to engage in public urination. 146 Thus, it is worth noting that
even when courts choose a consistent level of generality, it is possible that
two distinct formulations for arriving at a "narrow" level could produce
conflicting results. Williams demonstrates not only that Lawrence failed
to alleviate lower court confusion, but also that a consistent formulation
may be necessary to determine a consistent level of generality. 47
IV. SUMMARY OF THE LEVELS OF GENERALITY

The following is a summary of the discussion above. As one can see
from the chart, the U.S. Supreme Court has inconsistently applied the level
of generality.148 The Court used a broad level of generality in Griswold,149
while the Court used a narrow level of generality in Bowers. 50 Given the
enormous power of the Question Presented in characterizing the issue, it
is no surprise that a narrow generality has uniformly resulted in the Court's
denial of an asserted right, while a broad generality has uniformly resulted
in the Court's recognition of a right.

144. Id. at 1242.
145. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
146. Id.
147. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1232.
148. At least two law students have attempted to argue that Griswold,Eisenstadt,andLoving
are not inconsistent with footnote 6 of Michael H. See Cook, supra note 36, at 879-81; Timothy L.
Raschke Shattuck, Note, Justice Scalia's Due Process Methodology: Examining Specific
Traditions,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2743, 2759-63 (1992).
149. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
150. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

INCONSISTENT LEVELS OF GENERALITY

LEVEL OF GENERALITY 5 '
CASE

GENERALITY

FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT?

Griswold v. Connecticut
Loving v. Virginia
Bowers v. Hardwick (majority)
Bowers v. Hardwick (dissent)
Michael H. v. Gerald D.
(plurality)
Michael H. v. Gerald D. (dissent)
Reno v. Flores
Washington v. Glucksberg
Lawrence v. Texas (majority)
Lawrence v. Texas (dissent)
Williams v. Attorney General of

Broad
Broad
Narrow
Broad
Narrow

YES
YES
NO
YES
NO

Broad
Narrow
Narrow
Moderate
Narrow
Narrow

YES
NO
NO
MAYBE
NO
NO

Broad

YES

Alabama (majority)

Williams v. Attorney General of
Alabama (dissent)

V. PROBLEMS WITH EACH LEVEL OF GENERALITY

Depending on which members of the U.S. Supreme Court can garner
a majority of votes will not only determine the level of generality, but also
the method of analysis and the articulation of that method. However, as
disconcerting as that may seem, even if a consistent level is applied to each
case, whether broad, moderate, or narrow, each has its own shortcomings.
A. Broad Generality- Is There any Identifiable Method?
Justice Scalia is acutely aware of the criticisms of his overall judicial
philosophy and of his method for determining the appropriate level of
generality. His response to these criticisms, however, is that a consistently
narrow (even if somewhat flawed) methodology is better than no

151. Since Lawrence did not review the statute under strict scrutiny, even though the Court
purported to overrule Bowers, it is unclear whether it held that there is a fundamental right to
homosexual conduct in the privacy of one's own home. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
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methodology.' No other Justice on the Court has provided a suitable
alternative to replace the method offered by Justice Scalia in footnote 6 of
Michael H.;'53 absent any affirmative theory of their own, the other
members of the Court, as well as the judicially liberal members of
academia, are largely reduced to articulating counterarguments. 54
Before discussing the downfalls of applying a broader generality
method, it is worth noting that Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers is
convincing in one respect. It successfully argues that the most specific
example of a liberty right is not the liberty right itself.55 By distorting the
level of generality to focus on an example of the right, instead on the
broader liberty issue, the Court made no effort to genuinely and sincerely
evaluate the circumstances of the case.' 56 It is, after all, the responsibility
of the judiciary to decipher between essential and non-essential facts.
However, despite its strengths, Justice Blackmun's alternative level of
generality is completely unworkable. Were the Court to apply "the right
to be let alone"1'57 or a variation thereof to circumstances beyond the facts
of Bowers, fundamental rights would be found in any circumstances in
which a person was left to his or her own devices. Taken to its logical
extreme, Justice Blackmun's characterization would hold as a
constitutional guarantee the right to build a crystal methamphetamine lab
in a person's basement. Justice Blackman fails to articulate a level of
generality that can be consistently applied to other fundamental rights
cases and provokes opponents to parade a list of horribles. 158
152. "'You can't beat somebody with nobody."'Antonin Scalia, Originalism:TheLesserEvil,
57 U. IN. L. REV. 849, 855 (1989) (arguing that although originalism has its difficulties, unlike
nonoriginalism, it is an identifiable method).
153. 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
154. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 9, at 1071 (admitting that a broader approach is an
imprecise and indeterminate mission).
155. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-214 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
156. For example, Justice Blackmun pointed out that Katz v. United States was not a case
about the right to place interstate bets, but was about the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches. Furthermore, Stanley v. Georgia was not a case about the right to watch
pornographic movies, but was about the constitutional right to free speech. Id.at 199 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Stanleyv. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969)).
157. Id.
158. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (arguing
that a high level of abstraction would protect a fundamental right to prostitution, obscenity, and
adult incest); BORK,supra note 9, at 204 (arguing that a high level of abstraction would protect a
fundamental right to unconventional sexual behavior and kleptomania). The parade of horribles is
a rhetorical device whereby, in this case, the speaker argues against using a broad level of
generality by listing a number of undesirable results. Its power lies in its exaggeration and
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In addition to the glaring problem of the parade of horribles, there is
the concern that such a method could "permit judges to dictate rather than
discern ... society's views."'' For example, Justice Scalia pointed to
Justice O'Connor's and Justice Brennan's opinions in Michael H. 60 Each
Justice arbitrarily chose their own level of generality, and by doing so,
each decided the case differently. In dissent, Justice Brennan characterized
the issue as "whether parenthood is an interest that historically has
received our attention and protection"'61 and concluded that the
circumstances of this case fell within his characterization of the asserted
' Justice O'Connor in concurrence, hesitantly joined the plurality's
right. "62
characterization with the caveat that she may apply broader levels of
generality in future fundamental rights cases.'63 Although each Justice was
confronted with the same facts and precedent, each allowed his or her own
sympathies to dictate the level of generality, which caused each to decide
the case differently.
Admittedly, the parade of horribles argument is simplistic because it
ignores the role of the judiciary. Although any formulation can be taken
to a logical extreme, the judiciary has the responsibility to differentiate
between what is self-evidently wrong and what is not. Judges are asked
regularly to draw arbitrary lines between legal and illegal conduct, whether
it involves the balancing of competing interests in the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" test"' or whether it requires a
determination of what "shocks the conscience" under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'65 Although Griswold'6 6 and the Bowers'6 7 dissent utilized an
inarticulate and inapplicable formulation of generality, it is disingenuous
to claim that a system must be free from the consequences of logical
extremes or arbitrary dividing lines.
emotional impact. See Wikipedia "parade of horribles," availableat http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Parade of horribles (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
159. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. See id.The answer to the Question Presented by Justice Brennan is "too clear to dispute."
Id.
163. "I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of
historical analysis." Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542,
544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (arguing against Justice Scalia's insistence that the only method
that should be utilized is the one that recognizes the most specific level at which the asserted right
can be identified).
164. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
165. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
166. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
167. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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The most forceful and consequently fatal argument for utilizing broad
generality is the danger that judges will become judicial-legislators.
Should a court elect to consistently apply a broad level of generality, it
would be left to discern and interpret sweeping conclusions about
historically protected traditions.'68 The price of consistently applying a
broad level of generality would not only be a precarious increase in
judicial discretion, but also a violation of America's democratic system of
government.
B. Narrow Generality- Is this Really the Solution?
' it commits
Despite footnote 6's noble attempts and its lofty ambition, 69
the very same quandaries ofjudicial decisionmaking that it seeks to avoid
and it fails to satisfy the ambition of its design. In other words, "[flar from
providing judges with a value-neutral means for characterizing rights, it
instead gives a method for disguising the importation of values."' 7 ° Such
critic to boldly announce
a contradiction has left at least one distinguished
l
that footnote 6 is "doomed to fail.'' 17
Even those who disregard a cynical theory that footnote 6's generality
formulation was specifically designed to reinforce a politically
conservative agenda,'72 those who disagree with footnote 6 widely
168. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
169. Justice Scalia's methodology in footnote 6 has earned him much criticism, however it
"reflects an admirable intellectual rigor." Crump, supra note 12, at 866.
170. Tribe & Dorf, supranote 9, at 1059.
171. Id. at 1095.
172. Such a debate would prove fruitless anyway; and it is worth noting that this view is
contradictory to Justice Scalia's most famous opinions. Unexpectedlyto the casual observer, Justice
Scalia has, at times, been the Court's leading civil libertarian and the most active participant in
reversing decisions that protect a politically conservative agenda. In United States v. Eichman,
Justice Scaliajoined the majority as the fifth vote, in a five to four decision, invalidating a federal
law that banned the practice of flag burning on the grounds that it violated free speech. See United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). He did this despite later calling the petitioners in the case
"scruffy, bearded, sandal wearing people who go around burning the American flag." Alice
Koskela, ScaliaShows Textualists Have a Sense ofHumor, 43 ADVOCATE 31, 32 (2000). In BMW
v. Gore, contrary to the Republican Congress's legislative goal of reducing punitive damage
awards, Justice Scalia dissented from the Court's decision to overturn a state court's punitive
damage award of two million dollars on the grounds that it was "grossly excessive." See BMW v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). In Kyllo v. UnitedStates, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in
a 5 to 4 decision that held that the use of thermal imaging to detect heat differentiation in the home
(to find heat lamps used to grow marijuana), absent a warrant, was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment's constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches. See Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). Most recently, in the case of Blakely v. Washington, in another 5 to 4
decision and over the strong dissent of Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia reasoned that factors used
by trial judges in sentencing prisoners that are not considered by the jury and proved beyond a
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recognize its intellectual disingenuousness. "[T]he footnote 6 program
imports values surreptitiously - claiming all the while only to be
discovering values that are out there in societal traditions - it enables
judges to disguise and distort what is at stake."17' 3 There are three primary
ways in which footnote 6 does this. 74 First, it requires judges to identify
the most specific level of generality at which they can recognize a relevant
tradition. 175 This task is more easily done in theory than in practice.
Second, it requires judges to subjectively evaluate what has been
traditionally and historically protected in American society. 176 History is
far from a perfect science. 177 Lastly, it requires each judge's subjective and
individual analysis. 178 Each judge evaluating history has his or her own
personal prejudices, philosophy and forethought. There is no such thing as
the objective historical observer.

reasonable doubt, violated the Sixth Amendment's constitutional guarantee to a trial by jury.
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531,2536 (2004). These decisions illustrate that Justice Scalia
is driven by more than a desire to forward a politically conservative agenda. But see Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 144 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (commenting on how Justice Scalia
"no fewer than six times" overemphasizes that the plaintiff is an "adulterous natural father" and
implies that Justice Scalia is not viewing the facts of the case objectively).
173. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 9, at 1096.
174. A review of epistemological theories reveals that Justice Scalia's search for valueless
methodologies is problematic for a fourth reason: it is "self-referentially incoherent." As Roy
Clouser demonstrates, any belief that claims neutrality is in fact, a nonneutral belief. ROY CLOUSER,
KNOWING WITH THE HEART 87 (1999). This means, that, statements of belief, including neutral
claims, are value-based statements which must be referenced in order to make the original claim.
Justice Scalia uses his own values to say that he can create a method that is value-free. To clarify,
take the example of Charles Darwin's skepticism. Darwin questioned whether the human brain
could obtain knowledge or truth because the theory of evolution relies on random chance to
generate the characteristics common to a particular species. Since a human being's brain is merely
a random evolutionary byproduct, Darwin claimed that it could not be known for certain that beliefforming capacities were truthful. Id. at 88. However, for Darwin to provide such a skeptical outlook
for the capacities of the human brain to generate certain knowledge, he had to rely on the very
certainty he is questioning. To call the capacities of the human into question, Darwin had to rely
on the fact that the brain has accurate belief forming capacities. Darwin's skepticism, much like
those who claim to create value-less methodologies to determine fundamental rights, rely on the
very thing they are questioning, in order to question it. Thus, Justice Scalia, should abandon his
hopes of discovering a value-less method.
175. See MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
176. Seeid.
177. Given the tremendous level of scholarship devoted to utilizing history and tradition in the
law, this Article will not attempt to contribute to the discussion.
178. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
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Perhaps most problematic is the process of determining the most
specific tradition.'79 Since footnote 6's specificity has a logical stopping
point, 18 ° and does not require specificity beyond absurdity, it inevitably
fails to escape a choice based on values.' 8 ' As footnote 6 explains, if there
are no societal traditions either protecting or denying an asserted right,
judges are asked to "consult, and (ifpossible) reason from," the traditions
one increment more general than the one that did not yield a conclusive
answer. 8 2 In truth, there is no "most specific level."'8 3 Paradoxically,
footnote 6 refuses to decipher between the relevant and irrelevant facts of
Michael H., while at the same time it chooses not to include further
specificity such as the plaintiffs job, his or her race, or his or her
geographical region.8 4
Why is Justice Scalia's characterization of the issue more appropriate
than the following hypothetical characterization: Whether an adulterous,
African American, working class father whose child is living with her
affluent European American mother and stepfather can treat his
relationship as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our
society, or whether the relationship has been accorded special protection.
The answer is that neither Justice Scalia's characterization in MichaelH.
nor the proposed hypothetical is appropriate.185 Both involve making a
judgment regarding the correct level of specificity, fail to appreciate
essential and nonessential facts, defer the judiciary's role in the
adjudication process, and abandon the judiciary's responsibility to check
186
past and present legislation by the majority.
An analysis of the level of generality need not include history and
tradition, nor must it only selectively rely on them.'87 However, under the
guise of footnote 6, history and tradition are required elements that dictate

179. Tribe & Doff, supranote 9, at 1091; see also Steven R. Greenberger, JusticeScalia's
Due
Process TraditionalismApplied to TerritorialJurisdiction:The Illusion ofAdjudication Without
Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REV. 981, 1026 (1992).
180. See MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
181. Tribe & Doff, supra note 9, at 1091.
182. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See generally id.at 110.
186. Id.
187. In Lawrence,Justice Kennedy made selective use of history and tradition largely as a way
to determine that the prejudices of Bowers had passed and that there was an "emerging recognition"
of protection for homosexual conduct and other private conduct between consenting adults in the
privacy of their home. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
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rather than aid generality. 188 To Justice Scalia's dissenters, footnote 6's
linkage between history and tradition and the level of generality, promoted
the dangers of reinforcing a "stagnant, archaic, hidebound document
' Had a
steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past."189
specific level of generality been used that did not implicate a "dead"
Constitution,'9" it is doubtful that the justices would be so vigorous in their
objections.
It has been stated, "[tlo know the truth of history is to realize its
ultimate myth and its inevitable ambiguity."'' As any historian knows,
history is imperfect, and it is often recorded by those in powerful and
prestigious positions. When a judge searches through annals, the judge is
unwillingly exposed to writers who may have agendas of their own.
Historians, right or wrong, consciously or unconsciously, partake in
propaganda ranging from the benign - "herofication" of Helen Keller and
Woodrow Wilson, 92 to the destructive suppression of the barbaric
practices of Christopher Columbus.' 93 Merely discussing history as if it
were an objective source of determining the most specific description at
which a relevant tradition can be identified would naively subject one's
fundamental rights methodology to potentially treacherous values.' 94
Apart from the subjectivity of history itself, the subjectivity of the
judge looking through history also plays a part in deceptively importing
values. In the words of noted historian Howard Zinn,
It is not possible [to be an objective historian] ... What you get in
a history lecture is a selection by the writer ... and that selection is
made according to that .. writer's bias, and there's no way of
avoiding that. What I always tell my students from the outset is that
they're not going to get an objective history because they're going
to get my point of view .... 195

188. See MichaelH, 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
189. Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Crump, supranote 12, at 869 (commenting
on how the "real quarrel" reduces to the history-and-tradition approach itself).
190. In reference to his originalism, Justice Scalia is fond of saying that he likes his U.S.
Constitution "dead." David M. Zlotnick, JusticeScaliaandHis Critics:An ExplorationofScalia "s
Fidelity to His ConstitutionalMethodology, 48 EMORY L. J. 1377, 1382 (1999).
191. Ferenc M. Szasz, Quotes About History,at http://hnn.us/articles/1328.html (quoting Roy
P. Basler) (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
192. JAMES LOEWEN, LIES MY TEACHER TOLD ME 19 (1995).
193. Id. at 36.
194. See generally LOEWEN, supra note 192.
195. Wolf, supranote 66, at 127 (citing Audio tape: Howard Zinn Interview on KPFK, 90.7
FM, Los Angeles, Cal. (n.d.)).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY

(Vol. 16

Whether deliberately or not, judges view history through a lens clouded by
their own politics and philosophies and are likely to selectively choose
those traditions with which they are most familiar and can identify.
Historians, then, are the generalizers, the synthesizers. They look at
an event or series of events and try to bring relevant knowledge
from all fields to bear on understanding the situation. Viewed in this
light, history is a verb, not a noun - an approach rather than a
subject. This approach is sometimes termed the "historical
method," which - as I understand it generally involves trying to
identify all relevant information about an historical development,
critically examining sources for validity and bias, then selecting and
organizing this information into a well-constructed
narrative that
96
1
experience.
human
on
light
some
sheds
Judges are prone to the subjectivity of history itself and the undeniable
weaknesses of the historical method.
Apart from the disingenuous values of footnote 6, there is also a very
real practical problem. The method fails to account for the very purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment,197 the protection of minority interests. 98 A
methodology that requires a historical analysis of the most specific
generality at which the relevant tradition can be identified, reinforces
democratically sanctioned prejudice - the very core concern of Justice
Brennan's dissent in Michael H.'99
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to free Americans from
the shackles of government-sponsored oppression, not to further
past subjugation. To resort to tradition in interpreting the Due
Process Clause makes a mockery of the Fourteenth Amendment by
adopting discrimination as the paradigm against which the
government's actions are to be judged.2"'
The Due Process Clause was not meant to act as a source of redundancy
and it has become almost universally accepted, albeit begrudgingly by

196. Michael G. Maxwell, The Nature of History, available at http://studentsfiend.com/
onhist/nature.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
197. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
198. See Crump, supra note 12, at 867 (commenting on how criticism of Justice Scalia's
method is most forceful when it attacks the insufficient protection of minority rights).
199. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140-41 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. Wolf, supra note 66, at 103 (citation omitted).
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conservative scholars, as an independent source of substantive rights.
Inherently, given this design, a tension exists between the Clause's
independent protection of minority interests and the dangers of judicial
activism. Although this tension can never be adequately remedied, it can
be managed to where the level of generality exists so that each of these
concerns are reflected.
Supporters of Justice Scalia acknowledge the power of this criticism,
but refute it to the extent possible under a conservative judicial
philosophy.2"1 Perhaps the best response that can be offered is that the Due
Process Clause is not stagnant to an absolute degree. "The virtue of a
democratic system with a First Amendment is that it readily enables the
people, over time, to be persuaded that what they took for granted is not
so, and to change their laws accordingly.""2 2 Although it can take decades,
or perhaps even centuries, society's views of historically and traditionally
protected rights gradually progress.
Another counterargument offered by supporters, as well as Justice
Scalia himself, is that an insistence on the most specific level of generality
does not uniformly lead to a choice against recognizing an asserted
fundamental right.20 3 "[I]nstead, it is a mixed bag that sometimes will, and
sometimes will not, strengthen the individual's case." 2" In footnote 4 of
Michael H., Justice Scalia argued that Justice Brennan's method
incorrectly looked at the rights of the plaintiff in isolation from the
potential rights and consequences of the other parties involved.205 He
equated this characterization of the liberty interest to:
[F]iring a gun where the case at hand happens to involve its
discharge into another person's body. The logic of [such an
approach] ... leads to the conclusion that if [the plaintiff] . .. had
begotten [the child] ... by rape, that fact would in no way affect his

possession of a liberty interest in his relationship with her.20 6
A high degree of specificity in reviewing history and tradition inevitably
leads to a reinforcement of majority interests. However, it is possible that

201. See Shattuck, supra note 148, at 2781-82 (arguing that determining the protection of
minority interests under Scalia's formulation largely depends on one's view).
202. ScALIA DISSENTS 197 (Kevin A. Ring ed., 2004).

203. See Crump, supra note 12, at 870.
204. See id. at 869 (arguing that a specific definition of a tradition does not inevitably lead to
a choice against an asserted right).
205. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.4 (1989).
206. Id.
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denying the minority interest, by failing to recognize an asserted
fundamental right, protects the rights of the other parties involved. °7
Each of these replies falls well short of addressing their criticisms. By
asserting that footnote 6 protects minority interests, one fails to appreciate
the urgency and importance of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its passage
was meant to be an immediate response and solution to the prejudices of
the southern states. Furthermore, a "mixed bag" of rights that protect all
parties involved is hardly a genuine answer to Justice Brennan. In a case
such as Michael H.,2 other parties may have had countervailing interests.
However, in other fundamental rights cases, there may be third parties
with no legitimate interests. What is the countervailing interest in a case
such as Lawrence? °9 In his dissent in Lawrence, even Justice Thomas
admitted that the statute "is ... uncommonly silly,"21 a waste of law
enforcement resources, and that had he been a member of the Texas
" '
legislature, he would have voted to repeal the law.21
Thus, after much deliberation, it is evident that footnote 6's
requirement of the most descriptive level of generality fails to prevent the
importation of values and inhibits the very purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2" 2 Despite its admirable effort, it, like the broad generality of
Justice Scalia's detractors, has significant and unavoidable difficulties.
VI. CONSISTENCY, NOT "OBJECTIVITY" IS THE ANSWER

According to Paul Brest, "[O]bjectivity in legal interpretation... [is]
on a par with the fantasy of a single, objective reading of Hamlet or of
Balinese culture."2 3 Courts must engage in a more thought-provoking
analysis and abandon any attempt to discover a hidden treasure - a
valueless determination of the level of generality in unenumerated
fundamental rights. Motivated by Marbury v. Madison,214 it has become
an unavoidable consequence, intentional in design, 1 5 that the abstract
207. See id.
208. Id. at 110.
209. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
210. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,527
(1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
dissenting).
211. Id. (Thomas, J.,
212. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
213. Paul Brest, Interpretationand Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765, 771 (1982).
214. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury, the U.S. Supreme Court established the
doctrine of judicial review.
215. "Perhaps in a perfect world, elected legislatures would accomplish the generalization of
rights. But the Framers understood all too well that this is not a perfect world. Like it or not, judges
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phrases ofthe U.S. Constitution demand value-based decisionmaking from
the judiciary. Courts, especially conservative jurists, must move beyond
the indistinguishable fires ofjudicial activism and abandon false hopes of
a valueless system. "[T]he process of abstraction can never be performed
as a matter of pure logic; it will always involve judgment., 21 6 Individuals
import their perspective into everything they do, and determining how to
characterize an asserted fundamental right is no different.
.Abandoning the hopes of valueless determinations of the level of
generality is not a concession to the judicial legislators. It acknowledges
that footnote 6 will never succeed. Its failure lies not only in its design, but
also in its dismissive analysis and demeaning tone. z 7 It may never gain the
support of the majority of the people or more than two votes on the U.S.
Supreme Court.21 ' Judicial liberals will never be defeated, but they can be
controlled in a manner that strikes a balance between those who view
Justice Scalia as an example of judicial restraint and as the protector of
democracy, and those who view Justice Brennan as a defender of
individual rights.
The balance between alternative methodologies can be struck by
promoting the consistent application of a moderate level of generality.21 9
Consistency prevents a return to Lochner Era22 decisionmaking by
restraining the sympathies of the liberal judge. No longer will liberal
judges be permitted to arbitrarily expand the level of generality when the
facts of a case assimilate with individual policy. A moderate level of
generality empowers courts with a defined role, sanctioning more than
mere deference to the legislature on issues that demand a courageous
judiciary. Consistency, combined with a moderate level of generality,
addresses the concerns of both liberals and conservatives and abandons
insincere attempts to discover nonexistent judicial objectivity.

must squarely face the task of deciding how abstractly to define our liberties." Tribe & Dorf, supra
note 9, at 1099.
216. Greenberger, supra note 179, at 1029.
217. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
218. Had Justice Thomas been a member of the Court during Michael H., it is likely he too
would have joined Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist in footnote 6.
219. Tribe & Dorfare wrong when they claim that "[a]bstraction pushes us constantly to check
practice against principle." Tribe & Doff, supranote 9, at 1099. Abstraction is not the solution to
the problem, but is the problem itself. As abstraction increases and generality becomes broader,
courts are granted limitless power to exceed their authority and move past the boundaries of their
design.
220. During the disastrous Lochner Era, the U.S. Supreme Court often overturned the
legislature's regulation of economic rights on the grounds that they violated the Due Process
Clause.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 16

VII. CONCLUSION

Admittedly, a methodology that consistently applies a moderate level
of generality in characterizing unenumerated fundamental rights is not the
perfect solution. After all, "moderate" is a somewhat indistinct term and
it suffers from the same difficulties as applying the footnote 6
methodology.22 Just like there is no "most specific" level, there will never
be a complete consensus on what is "moderate." The goal of consistency
also suffers from shortcomings and nuance. Although Justice Scalia has
' it
warned that "[liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,"222
diminishes the value of consistency when courts lose sight of common
sense notions of justice and instead apply principle for its own sake.223
Despite the problems of applying a moderate level of generality to
unenumerated fundamental rights jurisprudence, a good faith effort to
utilize a moderate generality that is consistently applied is the most
practical and genuine solution. For the conservative, it offers a measure of
restraint. For the liberal, it offers the chance to protect and preserve
individual rights. In the end, the goal is not suppression of issues rightly
before the judiciary, but the prevention of question-begging formulas made
possible by judge made manipulation of the Question Presented.

221. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
222. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992)).
223. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921).

